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Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and 
the Constitution 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER* 
Michigan State University College of Law 
This Article explores the impact of a same-sex marriage amendment 
on the place of Indian tribes in the Federal Constitution. A same-sex 
marriage amendment, depending on the text, might serve to incorpo-
rate Indian tribes into the Federal Union as the third sovereign. The 
Constitution has not been amended to incorporate Indian tribes into 
the Federal Union, rendering their place in Our Federalism uncertain 
and unpredictable. A same-sex marriage amendment that applies to 
limit or expand tribal authority to recognize or authorize same-sex 
marriage could constitute an implicit recognition of Indian tribes as 
the third sovereign in the American system of federalism. Even an 
amendment that excludes mention of Indian tribes may have some-
thing to say about Indian tribes as the third sovereign. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a 19th century Michigan Supreme Court case immortalized by 
Robert Traver's Laughing Whitefish,l the court upheld the inheritance 
rights of the child of a polygamous marriage between two Chippewa 
Indians in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.2 The court wrote that "we 
had no more right to control [tribal] domestic usages than those of Tur-
key or India."3 Taking judicial notice "that among these Indians polyga-
mous marriages have always been recognized as valid,"4 the court 
* Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Director, Indigenous Law 
Program; Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians; Appellate 
Judge, Hoopa Valley Tribe, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, and Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Professor Fletcher is former in-
house counsel at the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, the Hoopa Valley Tribe, the Suquamish 
Tribe, and the Grand Traverse Band, and he has litigated over two dozen tribal court cases. Chi-
miigwetch to Wenona Singel, without whom this paper could not have been written. 
\. ROBERT TRAVER, LAUGHING WHITEFISH (1965). Mr. Traver was the pen name of John D. 
Voelker, the former Michigan Supreme Court justice who wrote Anatomy of a Murder. Frederick 
M. Baker, Jr. & Rich Vander Veen III, John D. Voelker: Michigan's Literary Justice, 79 MICH. 
B.J. 530 (2000); Books Received, 18 STAN. L. REV. 779, 780 (1966). For a description and partial 
explanation of Anishinaabe (Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi) practices of polygamy, see 
JAMES A. CLiFrON, THE POKAGONS, 1683-1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. 
JOSEPH RIVER VALLEY 61 (1984); RUTH LANDES, OJIBWA SOCIOLOGY 53-86 (1937). 
2. Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889). 
3. !d. at 605. 
4. [d. 
53 
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identified a conundrum: "We must either hold that there can be no valid 
Indian marriage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by 
Indian usages are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be 
taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes."5 
Times have changed. Most, if not all, Indian tribes no longer rec-
ognize polygamous marriages6 and Indian people tend to utilize the 
divorce laws as much as non-Indian people.7 The Upper Peninsula is no 
longer on the fringes of the American frontier. 8 Moreover, the laws of 
states often do apply to Indians and sometimes even Indian tribes.9 It 
remains settled black-letter law, however, that Indian tribes retain ple-
nary and exclusive inherent authority over "domestic relations among 
tribal members."10 
The fact that tribes control their own domestic relations well into 
the "modem era" I I of federal-state-tribal relations is a function of the sui 
generis character of federal Indian law. 12 Tribal authority has survived 
major changes after Congress instructed the President to cease treaty-
making with Indian tribes in 1871,13 after Congress declared all Indians 
to be citizens in 1924,14 and after Congress experimented with extending 
state civil jurisdiction into large parts of Indian Country in 1953.15 
Retained tribal authority may also be a function of the place of family 
law in "Our Federalism" 16 that designates domestic relations all but off-
5. [d. 
6. E.g., BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY TRIBAL CODE § 1401 (2004), available at http:// 
www.narf.org/nilllCodeslbaymillscode/chapterI4marriage.htm. 
7. E.g., Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian 
L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals 1997). 
8. Compare RICHARD M. DORSON, BLOODSTOPPERS & BEARWALKERS: FOLK TRADITIONS OF 
THE UPPER PENINSULA (1952) (describing Upper Peninsula traditions from frontier times), with 
JIM HARRISON, TRUE NORTH (2004) (fictionalizing the end of frontier times in the Upper 
Peninsula). 
9. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005) (upholding a 
state tax against a non-Indian retailer who passed the cost down to an Indian tribe); County of 
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) 
(holding that a state may tax land located within an Indian reservation and owned by an Indian 
where the land had been alienated in the Allotment Era). 
10. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 4.01[2][c], at 215 
(Nell Jessup Newton, ed. 2005) (citing Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); United States v. 
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916)). 
II. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987) [hereinafter 
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS]. 
12. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). 
13. COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.03[9], at 74-75. 
14. [d. § 1.04, at 83-84. 
15. /d. § 1.06, at 96-97. 
16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,428 (1939) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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limits to federal authority.17 This last, vigorous bastion of retained tribal 
governmental authority may become the staging grounds for an Ameri-
can constitutional rift. 
The exclusion of state laws from Indian Countryl8 in the arena of 
marriage has not generated much dispute in comparison with the litiga-
tion over, for example, Indian child adoption and custody.19 But that 
relative stillness may be in jeopardy. A few tribal legislatures and tribal 
courts have confronted the contentious subject of same-sex marriage. 
The Cherokee Nation's highest court has dismissed on procedural 
grounds a challenge to the marriage of a lesbian couple under tribal 
law?O The Cherokee and Navajo legislatures have acted to prohibit 
same-sex marriages in their respective jurisdictions.21 While the issue of 
same-sex marriages is far from the forefront of tribal governmental 
issues compared to issues such as tribal economic development22 and 
tribal criminal jurisdiction,23 there remains the distinct possibility that 
one or more of the 560-plus federally recognized Indian tribes24 will 
take action to recognize same-sex marriage in their jurisdictions. 
Numerous states have taken action to ban same-sex marriage, but 
not al1.25 And, in some jurisdictions, federal and state courts have deter-
mined that any such legislation would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause and other federal or state constitutional provisions?6 As a result, 
17. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 273 (1945); Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, 
Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 240-50 
(2005). 
18. "Indian Country" is a term of art defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
19. See COHEN, supra note 10, §§ 11.01-11.08, at 819-56. 
20. See In re the Marriage License of McKinley, No. JAT-04-15 (Judicial Appeals Tribunal 
of the Cherokee Nation 2005), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/ (registration required); 
In re the Marriage License of McKinley, No. JAT-05-11 (Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the 
Cherokee Nation 2005), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org! (registration required); 
Cherokee Court Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Challenge, INDlANZ.COM, Jan. 5, 2006, available at 
http://indianz.com!NewsI2006/0ii890.asp. 
21. See Wyatt Buchanan, Bay Area Celebration, Setbacks for Gay indigenous People; They '1/ 
Mark Parade Grand Marshal, Loss on Marriage Front, S.F. CHRON., June 25, 2005, at B I, 
available at 2005 WLNR 10025760. 
22. See generally Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian 
Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597 (2004). 
23. See generally Morris v. Tanner, No. 03-35922, 2005 WL 3525598 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 
2005), cert. denied 2006 WL 927031 (Oct. 10, 2006); Will Trachman, Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction after U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 847 (2005). 
24. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 71194 (Nov. 25, 2005). 
25. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional 
Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of 
Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 614 n.45 (200S). 
26. E.g., Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), 
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some opponents of same-sex marriage have proposed an amendment to 
the United States Constitution banning same-sex marriage?7 On the 
other hand, the American people may one day ratify an amendment that 
precludes governmental restriction on same-sex marriage. While it 
appears far from certain that such amendments would pass, this Article 
explores such an amendment's broader statement about the place of 
Indian tribes in the United States Constitution. 
If the Constitution can be divided into two general categories of 
provisions, structural and individual rights provisions,28 a same-sex mar-
riage amendment could have either a dramatic, or not-so-dramatic, 
impact on Indian tribes. A same-sex marriage amendment, operating as 
a structural amendment and depending on the text, might serve to incor-
porate Indian tribes into the Federal Union as the third sovereign, a topic 
often discussed by federal Indian law scholars.29 While Indian tribes as 
sovereign entities predated the Constitution and did not participate in the 
discussions over the founding document,30 the territory of the American 
state has engulfed and the federal government has asserted exclusive 
authority over the tribes?l Despite this fact, the Constitution has not 
been amended to incorporate Indian tribes into the Federal Union, ren-
overruled by Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006); Goodridge v. 
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
27. See Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra note 25, at 638; Joseph William Singer, Same Sex 
Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, I STAN. J. C.R. & c.L. I, 2 
(2005), available at http://heinonline.orgIHOLlPage?handle=hein.joumals/stjcrcll &id=5& 
collection=joumals; Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks 
to Federalism in Family Law, 2 ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 139 (2004). 
28. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Do Constitutional Provisions Matter? Canada's Recognition 
of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 17 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of 
Michigan Department of Political Science) (citing Cass Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: 
An Epilogue, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 327 (Jon Elster & Rune Siagstad, eds. 
1988)). Cf Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1114-20 
(2005) (describing the election law "rights-structure debate"). 
29. See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 113, 160 (2002); Frank Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in 
Indian Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743 (2004) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows]; 
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119 
HARV. L. REv. F. 28 (2006), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.orglforurnlissues/ 119/ 
dec05/skibine.shtml (last visited April 13, 2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, 
Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47 (2004); Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need 
for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON c.L. & C.R. I (2003); Carol Tebben, An American 
Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 
(2003). 
30. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA's CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005). 
31. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,200 (2004); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996); Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2001), 
cen. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002). 
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dering their place in Our Federalism uncertain and unpredictable.32 A 
same-sex marriage amendment that results in limiting or expanding tri-
bal authority to recognize or authorize same-sex marriage could consti-
tute an implicit recognition of Indian tribes as the third sovereign in the 
American system of federalism. Even an amendment that excludes 
mention of Indian tribes may have something to say about Indian tribes 
as the third sovereign. 
As to individual rights, a same-sex marriage amendment that 
excludes Indian tribes would raise important questions about whether 
the Constitution's individual rights declarations and protections apply to 
the exercise of tribal governmental authority. As the law stands, the Bill 
of Rights and other individual rights protections do not limit the exercise 
of tribal governmental authority.33 For example, the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, which sets the age for federal elections at eighteen rather 
than twenty-one, does not apply to Indian tribes.34 But the same federal 
circuit implied that, without making the specific holding, Indian tribes 
might not be allowed to set the voting age at twenty-one in contraven-
tion of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.35 If an amendment passed 
prohibiting all same-sex marriages but excluding mention of Indian 
tribes, would that amendment limit tribal recognition and authorization 
of such marriages? If an amendment passed prohibiting restrictions on 
same-sex marriage and again omitting mention of Indian tribes, would 
that amendment limit tribal authority? These issues raise larger ques-
tions about the Constitution's application to Indian tribes and to the third 
sovereign's place in Our Federalism. 
Part I describes the state of law relating to Indian tribes' incorpora-
tion into the federal Constitution. Indian tribes predate the Constitution. 
The Founders did not conceive Indian tribes as being part of the Federal 
Union because they were located outside the territorial bounds of the 
original thirteen states. As a result, the tribes were not included in the 
32. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("schizophrenic"); Philip P. Frickey, 
(Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431,434-35 (2005) 
[hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]; Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its 
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1754, 1754 
(1997); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Coun in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1576 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, 
Conquering]; Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional 
Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 403 (1991/1992). 
33. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo 
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (lOth Cir. 1959); STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND 
TRIBES 278-79 (Southern Illinois University Press, 3rd ed. 2002). 
34. See Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th CiT. 
1975). 
35. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 820 (1978). Contra Wounded Head, 507 F.2d at 1081. 
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provisions of the Constitution except as outside governmental entities. 
But while history shows that Indian tribes are now surrounded by the 
states, the Constitution lags behind in recognizing the legal implications 
of that fact. As a result, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts 
are slow to recognize the validity of exercises of tribal governmental 
authority. Moreover, because Indian tribes predate the Constitution and 
because the Founders excluded Indian tribes, the restrictions on govern-
mental activity included in the Constitution do not, as a general matter, 
apply to tribal governments. Therefore, Indian tribes are left as outsid-
ers in the constitutional scheme of protecting individual rights while pre-
serving tribal self-determination. In sum, these constitutional conditions 
tend to convince the Supreme Court to restrict the authority of tribal 
governments to that of private associations, where their laws apply in 
very limited circumstances.36 
Part II opens with a general description of the debate about same-
sex marriage in the United States and in Indian Country. In the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA),37 Congress included Indian tribes in the Act's 
application,38 which was neither the first nor the last time Congress 
enacted legislation that recognized Indian tribes as a third sovereign.39 
In part as a result of this enactment, some Indian tribes have begun to 
confront the possibility of either recognizing or banning same-sex mar-
riage. The cultural context of this debate is far removed from the cul-
tural context of the same-sex marriage debate outside of Indian 
Country.40 Part II also mentions the possibility that the American peo-
ple may enact an amendment to the Constitution banning same-sex mar-
riage. Such a ban, like the DOMA, might include Indian tribes in its 
provisions, but the draft proposals tend not to include Indian tribes. 
Part III analyzes the less likely scenario in which the American 
people enact a constitutional amendment on same-sex marriage, either 
banning or protecting same-sex marriage, and include Indian tribes in 
the text. This Article argues that such an amendment would serve as a 
formal, yet implicit, incorporation of Indian tribes into Our Federalism, 
alongside states, as powerful and recognized sovereigns with separate 
and unique authorities and rights. The Supreme Court has identified 
36. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). See COHEN, supra note 10, 
§ 7.02, at 599-607. But see United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.). 
37. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at I U.S.c. § 7,28 
U.S.c. § 1738C (2000». 
38. [d. 
39. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (2001); Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2001). 
40. See Part II, infra. 
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many limitations on the exercise of tribal governmental authority, which 
are expressed by the Court as "implicit divestitures."41 Although the 
Court alone has identified these divestitures, one could argue that the 
policy making branches of the federal government have acquiesced to 
them.42 After an amendment recognizing or identifying Indian tribes as 
a third sovereign, continued "discovery" of implicit divestitures by the 
Court would be less legitimate. However, an amendment that mentions 
Indian tribes, but does not express their specific place in Our Federalism 
might not affect the outcomes in federal court litigation between states 
and Indian tribes that now tend to favor states.43 
Part IV analyzes the more likely scenario in which the American 
people enact a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in 
the United States without mentioning Indian tribes. This Article argues 
that such an amendment would not serve to restrict a tribal government's 
exercise of its inherent authority to either restrict or authorize same-sex 
marriage. Indian tribes already retain undisturbed inherent authority to 
decide matters of domestic and family law within Indian Country.44 
Accordingly, tribal governments would be free, even after a constitu-
tional amendment, to enact legislation on same-sex marriage in contra-
vention of that amendment. As a result, some Indian tribes could 
become islands of nonconforming law in an area where the American 
41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit divestiture" as 
"that part of sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status"); 
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over NOllmembers in Tribal Legal 
Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. LJ. 1047, 1053-67 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, "Power over this 
Ullfortullate Race": Race, Politics and Illdiall Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1957,2046-49 (2004); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locatillg 
Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 353, 371 (1994) 
available at http://heinonline.orgIHOLIPDF?handle::ohein.joumals /aind 19&id=359&print=section 
&section::018&ext=.pdf; Philip P. Frickey, A Commoll Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial 
Divestiture of Illdian Tribal Authority Over NOllmembers, 109 YALE LJ. I, 43-48 (1999); Philip 
P. Frickey, Marshallillg Past alld Present: Colonialism, COllstitutionalism, alld Interpretation ill 
Federalllldian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,437 n.243 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, COllgressiollal 
Intent, Practical Reasolling, alld the Dynamic Nature of Federal Illdian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 
1137, 1160-64 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey, Congressional Intent]; Getches, Conquering, supra 
note 32, at 1595-1617; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow 
Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservatioll Diminishment, Modem Demography ad 
the Illdiall Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); Laurie Reynolds, 
"Jurisdiction" ill Federal Illdian Law: COllfusion, Contradictioll, alld Supreme Court Precedellt, 
27 N.M. L. REv. 359, 377-80 (1997); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit 
Divestiture Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notioll of Federalism in Illdiall Country, 36 
TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80 (2000); Dean Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game 
Theory ill Federallndiall Law, a Theory that Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 97-124 (2002). 
42. See Frickey, (Native) Americall Exceptiollalism, supra note 32, at 459-60. 
43. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control ill Illdian Coulltry, 53 FED. 
LAW. 38, 39-42 (March/April 2006) [hereinafter Fletcher, Reviving]. 
44. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). 
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people appear to have spoken with finality. Federal courts confronted 
with the question of whether tribes could become islands of noncon-
forming law would be hard-pressed to either affirm tribal sovereignty or 
disclaim foundational federal Indian law. Either way, the result may yet 
be the formal and surprising incorporation as a matter of federal consti-
tutional common law of Indian tribes into Our Federalism. 
Federal Indian law is already at a constitutional crossroads in other 
areas: Whether Congress has authority to overturn Supreme Court deci-
sions relating to implicit divestiture and whether Congress can authorize 
Indian tribes to assert criminal or even civil jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers.45 A same-sex marriage amendment, tribal nonconformance, and 
the federal or state response to tribal nonconformity could generate yet 
another constitutional crisis in federal Indian law. 
I. INDIAN TRIBES AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Indian Tribes as an Anomaly in the Constitutional Structure 
Indians are mentioned in the Declaration of Independence.46 The 
colonists considered the Indians to be brutal savages, threatening the 
safety and business interests of the signers of the Declaration, a force 
that the king did not repel with sufficient success.47 After the Revolu-
tion, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation still treated Indian 
tribes as a powerful force, but chose to treat them as legal entities akin to 
foreign nations.48 The Articles granted the federal government exclu-
sive authority to deal with Indian nations.49 Under the Articles' provi-
sion on Indian tribes, state legislatures had undefined authority to 
subvert federal actions in the field. 50 Before and after the Revolution, 
the country's leaders assumed Indian tribes would always remain 
outside of the territorial bounds of the United States.51 Any tribes sur-
rounded by American territories and states would have to be assimilated, 
45. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or 
Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 271 (2003). 
46. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776) ("the merciless Indian 
Savages ... "). 
47. See Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46 BUFF. 
L. REv. 1041,1046-47 (1998); John R. Wunder, "Merciless Indian Savages" and the Declaration 
of Independence: Native Americans Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L. 
REv. 65, 65-66 (2000-2001). 
48. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1069, 1083-84 
(2004) [hereinafter Prakash, Against]. 
49. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777 art. IX. 
50. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
113, 130-31 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, There Is No). 
51. See Prakash, Against, supra note 48, at 1082-83. 
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a policy perpetuated in various forms until the latter half of the 20th 
century.52 
Indians and Indian tribes appear twice in the original text of the 
Constitution and once again in the Fourteenth Amendment. The most 
critical mention is listed in Congress's enumerated powers under Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 3, often referred to as the "Indian Commerce 
Clause."53 It seems clear that the Founders intended to retain exclusive 
federal authority to deal with the Indian nations, but the Clause does not 
expressly state this.54 This language differs in significant ways from the 
language in the Articles.55 Regardless, the Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged that the Indian Commerce Clause bestows exclusive and 
plenary power to deal with Indian tribes,56 including the power to legis-
late over Indian tribes.57 But the Founders' apparent intent has been 
undermined by a modem parallel debate over the meaning of the Inter-
state Commerce Clause started in large part by former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.58 Some Indian law scholars agree with the originalist skepti-
cism of the extent of federal authority under the Indian Commerce 
Clause59 and further question the moral legitimacy of such broad federal 
authority.6o 
Manifest Destiny meant that American people in the East would 
push Indian tribes to the West.61 At the same time, the federal govem-
52. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84. 
53. But see AMAR, supra note 30, at 108 (referring to the clause as a "with-and-among" 
clause). 
54. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 43 
(1996) [hereinafter Frickey, Domesticating]. 
55. See Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal 
Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 656-57 (2003). 
56. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501(1979); United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 
363,367 (1944); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283,418 (1849) (Wayne, J.); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 573 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,36 (1831) 
(Baldwin, J., concurring). 
57. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding Congressional abrogation 
of Indian treaty without tribal consent). 
58. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1061-62 (2001); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2005); David H. 
Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind 
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 320-21 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, 
Beyond]; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 
(2004). 
59. See Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 301. 
60. E.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 
(1986). 
61. See John Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of 
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 1. L. & POL'y 347 366-67 (1999); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine 
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ment pursued a policy of "measured separatism" in its treaty-making 
policy toward the tribes.62 Indian Country, once defined as all land 
outside the territory of the United States,63 became subsumed over time 
into American states and territories.64 Despite numerous opportunities 
to deal with the constitutional problem that Indian tribes posed, espe-
cially during the Reconstruction era,65 the American people never 
amended the Constitution to reflect the existence of Indian tribes within 
their borders or express the tribes' situation within the constitutional 
scheme of federalism.66 Indian tribes were no longer foreign nations or 
states.67 Indian Country was not an American territory, a term of art 
contemplated by the Constitution.68 Indian Country was not like the 
District of Columbia,69 nor was Indian Country like Puerto Rico.70 
Indian tribes, Indian Country, and federal Indian law were and are sui 
generis - "extraconstitutional."71 
The Constitution contains two references to Indians as individuals, 
both of which are now considered atavistic and meaningless in the mod-
em era. Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 provides that "Indians not 
taxed" cannot be included in counting the American population for pur-
poses of representation in Congress and the Electoral College.72 The 
Fourteenth Amendment includes identical language.73 Here, it appears 
the Founders assumed that some individual Indians could reside in areas 
of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REv. I, 112 (2006) [hereinafter Miller, 
Doctrine]. 
62. See WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note II, at 4. 
63. See Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Lacated Within 
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 55, 70-71 (1998). 
64. See 18 U.S.c. § 1151 (1949); Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and 
the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 440 
(1998). 
65. See EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ON INDIAN TRIBES, S. Rep. No. 41-268 
(1870). 
66. See Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows, supra note 29, at 756-57. 
67. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I (1831).· 
68. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 129 (1960) (Black, I., 
dissenting); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886). 
69. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). 
70. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. I (1901); DAVID F. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 59-65 (1990) (discussing the so-called 
"Insular Cases"). 
71. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,213 (2004) (Kennedy, I., concurring). See Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Powers Inherellt in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. I, 25 (2002); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of 
Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 776 (1993). 
72. U.S. CONST. an. I, § 2. 
73. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. 
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within the American borders, but not become citizens or be subject to 
taxation by federal or state governments.74 Since 1924, all Indians born 
within the United States are American citizens, regardless of whether 
they choose to be citizens.75 As American citizens, they are subject to 
federal tax.ation in general, although they may retain numerous state and 
local tax immunities.76 The 1924 Act appears to have eliminated all 
significance to the "Indians not taxed" language.77 
In a constitutional sense, Indian tribes are an anomaly.78 The text 
does not appear to recognize tribal sovereignty except in an implicit 
fashion, although the evidence of that recognition is as close to conclu-
sive as possible.79 But while Indian tribes retain sovereign authority, 
their members maintain three types of citizenship simultaneously: tribal, 
American, and state citizenship.80 Thus, while American Indian citizens 
have the benefit of federal and state constitutional rights protections, 
such as those included in the Bill of Rights, they also have the benefit of 
any rights protected under their tribal Constitution.8l 
This stands in marked contrast, even irony, to the fact that constitu-
tional rights protections do not limit the exercise of tribal governmental 
authority.82 For example, the Supreme Court has held that where one 
Cherokee Indian murders another Cherokee Indian within the jurisdic-
tion of the Cherokee nation, this is not an offense against the United 
States, but rather only an offense against the local laws of the Cherokee 
nation.83 A vast number of Indian tribes, as history shows, were foreign 
nations84 (except to the most skeptical Founders or significant contem-
74. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); AMAR, supra note 30, at 439 n. *; see also id. 
(citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27). 
75. See generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the 
Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon 
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETfER L. J. 107 (1999). 
76. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195,225 n.161 (1984) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973». 
77. See Porter, supra note 75, at 123-28. 
78. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing 
Indian tribes as "extraconstitutional sovereign[s]"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,27-28 
(Johnson, J., dissenting) ("anomaly"); Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 54, at 34 ("anomaly"); 
Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 
807 -08 (2006) ("extraconstitutional"). 
79. See generally Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50. 
80. See Tebben, supra note 29, at 346-47. 
81. See Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
82. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
83. Id. 
84. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 50-74 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state as late as 1831); Joseph C. Burke, The 
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500,514 (1969). 
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poraries85) during the time of the Founding86 and even during the time 
of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Tribes predate the 
Constitution with a sovereignty that existed "from time immemorial."88 
Tribal leaders did not negotiate or execute any of the provisions of the 
Constitution, and, as a result of the peculiar Lockean notion of the con-
sent of the governed, legal authorities agree that the Constitution does 
not apply to Indian tribes.89 Specific examples of this exemption 
include the fact that Indian tribes were free to disregard Anglo-American 
concepts of "due process" and "equal protection"90 until Congress inter-
jected a version of the Bill of Rights into Indian Country in 1968.91 
Indian people are not constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial under the 
Seventh Amendment in tribal courtS.92 Indian people are not constitu-
tionally guaranteed a right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments in tribal courtS.93 As a practical matter, Indian tribes generally 
85. See Cherokee Nation at 31-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (arguing that the Cherokee Nation 
retained no sovereignty in 1831); Burke, supra note 84, at SIS (discussing Justice Baldwin's 
opinion in Cherokee Nation). 
86. See Prakash, Against, supra note 48, at 1107 ("As far as the intentions of the 
Constitution's Founders (both the Framers and the Ratifiers), there is no evidence that any of them 
sought to have the Constitution protect Indian tribes."). 
87. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note SO, at 145-46 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 
(1884)). 
88. McClahanan v. State Tax Commission of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("It must 
always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign 
nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."); see 
Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985); United States v. 
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 359 (1941); Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 351, 356 (1926); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60,62 (1906); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,559 (1832); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian 
Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861,906 (2000); Daniel Kelly, Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American 
Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655 (1975). 
89. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note SO, at 162; Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the 
Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 841, 847 (1990); Richard Collins, Indian Consent to 
American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989); Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The 
Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over Nonmember Indians: An Examination of the Basic 
Framework on Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & 
J. 70, 74 (1991); Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some 
Initial Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 457, 461 (1997); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty 
and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. I, IS (1991) (footnote omitted); David Williams, Legitimation 
and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 403, 478-79 (1994). 
90. See Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe of S. Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1957). 
91. See 25 U.S.c. § 1302(8) (2006). 
92. See Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal 
+-> Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,42 n. 103 (2004) [hereinafter Clinton, Comity]; Kevin 
J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on 
Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 85 n.96 
(1990) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978)). 
93. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 361 n.124 (2004). 
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provide these guarantees in accordance with tribal constitutional, statu-
tory, or common law,94 but they cannot be required to do so by the 
American Constitution. In addition, the Establishment Clause does not 
serve to prohibit the theocratic governments of the desert southwest 
tribes and Pueblos,95 a result that is both a question of governmental 
structure and individual rights. In short, measured separatism provided 
Indian tribes a place in Our Federalism to make their own laws and be 
governed by them.96 
B. The Supreme Court's Resulting Distrust of Tribal Governments 
For the Supreme Court, the exercise of sovereign authority by a 
governmental entity in the United States should derive from either the 
federal government or the states.97 The federal government and the 
states entered into the compact known as the Constitution and, as such, 
are the only obvious legitimate outlets of governmental authority.98 As 
the Constitution states and as the Founders intended, in general, the fed-
eral government controls foreign and interstate questions,99 while states 
handle their own internal and local affairs.lOo It would seem that since 
Indian tribes are now located within the borders of the states, state law 
would control their destiny. 
But federal Indian law, derived in large part from the Indian Com-
merce Clause,101 treaties with Indian tribes,102 and a "preconstitutional" 
94. E.g., CONST. OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS Art. X, 
§ I (1988), available at http://thorpe.ou.edulconstitutionlGTBcons3.html; Turtle Mountain 
Judicial Board v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, No. 04-007 (Turtle Mountain 
Appellate Court 2005), available at http://www.turtle-mountain.cc.nd.us/cases.htm; Clinton, 
Comity, supra note 92, at 42 n.103. 
95. See Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REv. 657, 665 (1992); Valencia-Weber, supra note 92, at 361-62. 
96. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 11; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 
(1959). 
97. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542-43 (1976) (federal authority over state 
authority); Graves v. N.Y. ex reI. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) (federal authority); Luther v. 
Borden, 48 U.S. I, 34 (1849) (state authority). 
98. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 570-71 (1832), superseded by statute, 43 U.S.C.S. 
§ 666, 66 Stat. 549, as recognized in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
99. See AMAR, supra note 30, at 107-08; Saikrishna Prakash, The Three Commerce Clauses 
and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2003). E.g., 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206-07 (2005) (citing Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. III 
(1942)); Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REv. 695, 701-
06 (1996). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,618 (2000). 
101. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
102. See, 541 U.S. at 200; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-566 (1903); Cherokee 
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902). 
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federal authority to deal with Indian tribes,l03 compels the opposite 
result. States have, as a general matter, no authority over reservation 
Indians. 104 The federal government continues a long-standing "trust 
relationship" with Indian tribes and Indian people, forming part of its 
special political relationship with both Indian tribes and individual Indi-
ans. 105 Indian treaties, unless abrogated by an express Act of Congress, 
remain in full force, even though the (indirect, third-party) beneficiaries 
often are American citizens who happen to be Indian people. 106 Finally, 
inherent tribal governmental authority remains intact unless divested by 
express action of Congress or some other divestiture. 107 For example, 
Indian tribes retain immunity from suit even by a state in federal, state, 
and tribal courts. !Os This is a significant sovereignty. 
But tribes are not states and they have no Tenth or Eleventh 
Amendment to guard them from federal or state intrusion in their affairs. 
From the very earliest pronouncement of the foundational principles of 
federal Indian law, the Marshall Trilogy, 109 and the even earlier congres-
sional pronouncements of federal Indian law and policy, the 
103. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
315-22 (1936); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557; other citations omitted). 
104. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-222 (1959); 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 517 (1831); Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 
CONN. L. REv. 1055, 1179-81 (1995); Mike McBride, III, Oklahoma's Civil-Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction over Indian Activities in Indian Country: A Critical Commentary on Lewis v. Sac & 
Fox Tribe Housing Authority, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 81, 120-21 (1994); G. William Rice, 
Employment in Indian Country: Considerations Respecting Tribal Regulation of the Employer-
Employee Relationship, 72 N.D. L. REv. 267,269 (1996). 
105. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1108-1109 (2005); Rodina 
Cave, Comment, Simplifying the Indian Trust Responsibility, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 1399 (2000); 
Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism 
Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REv. 757, 802-06 (2001); Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian 
Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 635 (1982); Angela R. Riley, Indian 
Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement under the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 74 (2002); Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247 
(2003). 
106. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); 
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.O. Mich. 1979). 
107. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 174 n.24 (1982) (quoting Earl 
Mettler, A Unified Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.1. 89,97 (1978»; United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 13, 323 (1978). 
108. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-56 (1998); Okla. Tax 
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991). 
109. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the 
Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006), draft available at http://papers.ssm.com/ 
so13/papers.cfm? abstracUd=924547. 
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Nonintercourse Acts, 110 tribal authority has been subject to both explicit 
and implicit divestiture without consent. III Nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits Congress or the Supreme Court from winnowing down tribal 
governmental powers, or even relegating individual Indians to a status 
(some might say) below that of non-Indian American citizens, such as in 
the area of criminal jurisdiction. I 12 To this day, Congress retains incred-
ible authority to regulate Indian tribes, as long as their enactments meet 
the rational basis test. I \3 And Congress has done so, both to the advan-
tage and disadvantage of Indian tribes and individual Indians. 114 But 
Congress alone cannot amend the Constitution. 
In the end, the Supreme Court decides what the Constitution 
means. 115 Although the Court granted almost unlimited deference to 
Congress when it made positive law in the field,116 where Congress has 
been silent or vague, the Court has taken the lead as both constitutional 
interpreter and, according to many legal authorities, national federal 
Indian policymaker.117 The Rehnquist Court's pronouncements on fed-
eral Indian law have been both bold and "ruthlessly pragmatic."118 
While Congress appears to have acquiesced to all but a few decisions, 
the Court maintained a sort of "judicial plenary power." I 19 The Court's 
decisions in cases where tribal authority conflicted with state or local 
110. See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1484 (2005) 
("In 1790, Congress passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, commonly known as the 
Nonintercourse Act. Periodically renewed and remaining substantially in force today, the Act bars 
sales of tribal land without the acquiescence of the Federal Government." (citations omitted». 
III. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 325-26 (listing examples of divestitures of tribal inherent 
authority). 
112. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
113. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371,415 (1980); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. 
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977); Pommersheim, Is There, supra note 45, at 271 n.4; Comment, 
Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235 
(1982). 
114. Compare Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding Congress's 
abrogation of Indian treaties in favor of the General Allotment Act), with United States v. Lara, 
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding Congressional reaffirmation of tribal inherent authority to 
prosecute nonmember Indians). 
115. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
177 (1803). 
116. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); Board of Comm'rs of Creek 
County v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718-19 (1943); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 311 (1911). 
117. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 454; Getches, Beyond, 
supra note 58, at 357; David E. Wilkins, The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of 'Implied Repeals:' 
A Requiem for Indigenous Treaty Rights, 43 AM. 1. LEGAL HIST. 1,4 (1989). 
118. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, a! 460. 
119. See Clinton, Comity, supra note 92, at 62; Clinton, There Is No, supra note 50, at 259; 
Pommersheim, Constitutional Shadows, supra note 29, at 751; Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A 
Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 304 (2003-2004); 
Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a 
Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328 (1991); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The 
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authority;120 where tribal authority conflicted with nonmembers' indi-
vidual rights; 121 and where individual Indians sought any relief whatso-
ever,122 have overwhelmingly favored non-Indian interests. 123 These 
results tum the foundation of federal Indian law on its head, but given 
the political ideology of the Rehnquist Court, these results are unsurpris-
ing.124 Whether a decision could be found to be a result of an originalist 
Court,125 a strict constructionist Court,126 an activist Court,127 or a tenta-
tive and minimalist Court,128 the fact that the Constitution does not 
incorporate Indian tribes implies that the Roberts Court also will be 
reluctant to value tribal governmental interests over state or federal 
interests or nonmember interests. 129 Moreover, the members of the 
Court know they are not constrained by constitutional provisions in 
deciding their Indian cases as they believe matters ought to be. 130 
Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the 
Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CaNsT. L. 405, 412 (2003). 
120. E.g., City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005); 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
121. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
122. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
123. See Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 279-81. 
124. See John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, 
Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. 
REV. 787, 902-03 (1999) ("In effectively promoting the compulsory propagation of 'the State's 
own rules and traditions' within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, the Kennedy/Rehnquist 
opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe illustrates the Rehnquist Court's signatory tendency to adjudicate 
disputes implicating both state and tribal interests in disregard of fundamental tenets of federal 
Indian law, in order to 'enrich' the States at the expense of the Tribes."). See generally Getches, 
Beyond, supra note 58; Getches, Conquering, supra note 32; Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie 
Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PuB. LAND L. REV. I (1995). 
125. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
126. See Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REv. 77, 100-01 
(1985) ("Terms such as 'strict construction,' an 'activist court,' or 'judicial restraint' cease to have 
meaning when used by opponents of equality who were never committed to abstract principles, 
but only to preserving segregation at any cost."). 
127. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a 
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 155, 170-71 (1984) (accusing the Burger Court of 
judicial activism). 
128. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and 
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (200 I). 
129. See Bruce Bothelo, Mayor of Juneau, Alaska and former Alaska Attorney General, 
Address before the Federal Bar Association's Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, NM (April 6, 
2006) (asserting that Chief Justice Roberts will not be sympathetic to tribal interests). Cf 
generally Cass R. Sunstein, John Roberts, Minimalist: He's Conservative, but He's No 
Fundamentalist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2005, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editoriall 
feature.html ?id= II 0007208. 
130. See Getches, Conquering, supra note 32, at 1575 ("[O]pinions in this field have not 
posited an original state of affairs that can subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but 
have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all 
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II. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE AND INDIAN COUNTRY 
Same-sex marriage became a national policy issue after the Court 
decided Lawrence v. Texas, 13 I striking down anti-sodomy laws that 
applied to gay and lesbian persons and no others because these laws 
violated their right to privacy as protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 132 In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the 
Court seemed to be recognizing that if sex between members of the 
same sex could not be criminalized, then it made sense to many that 
discriminatory bans on same-sex marriage should be struck down as 
well. 133 In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided 
Goodrich v. Department of Public Health,134 finding on the basis of 
both federal and state constitutional law that the state law ban on same-
sex marriage was unconstitutional. 135 In the following year, a large 
swath of states enacted via public referendum amendments to their state 
constitutions that banned same-sex marriage. 136 Nebraska's ban, more 
severe than many others,137 was struck down by the federal district 
court. I38 The Eighth Circuit reversed on July 14, 2006, holding the ban 
legislation, and the congressional 'expectations' that it reflects, down to the present day.") 
(quoting Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., (Apr. 4, 
1990) (Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546), in Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (reproduced from the 
Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress». Cf Frickey, (Native) American 
Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 467 ("Justice Kennedy's line of reasoning exemplifies the root 
problem in federal Indian law. The place of federal Indian law in American public law can be 
understood by imagining layers of law, with American constitutionalism built on top of American 
colonialism. Above the colonial line, America has what amounts to a civil religion of 
constitutionalism. Justice Kennedy is one of many believers who have in the Constitution a 'faith 
[that) is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' This constitutional 
faith may be crushed when the eye drifts below the colonial line, which is presumably one reason 
why most eyes never venture that far. I say 'may be' rather than 'is' because a true believer like 
Justice Kennedy might respond to the problem not by a loss of faith, but by a call to missionary 
work. For in both Duro and his separate opinion in Lara, Justice Kennedy has sought to bring our 
civil religion to Indian country.") (quoting Hebrews 11: 1 (King James)). 
131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
132. See id. at 578-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor would have struck down 
the statute on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and also would not have 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). [d. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
133. See id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. 
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."). 
134. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
135. See id. at 959-61. 
136. See Amy Miller, Marriage Equality v. The Defense of Marriage Acts, Address at Helen 
Hamilton Day, University of North Dakota School of Law (March 31, 2006) (videotape on file 
with author). 
137. See id. 
138. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc., v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd, 
455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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to be constitutional. 139 
After Goodrich in 2004, two Cherokee women walked into the 
Cherokee tribal court and applied for a marriage license. 14o The Chero-
kee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal dismissed two challenges to their 
application on the grounds that the challengers lacked standing because 
they had not suffered an injury"41 Meanwhile, the Navajo Nation's leg-
islature enacted the Dine Marriage Act, which banned same-sex 
marriage. 142 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA),143 creating an exception to the full faith and credit doctrine 
allowing state courts to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage legal in 
another state or jurisdiction. l44 The statute incorporated Indian tribes 
into the mix as a third sovereign, authorizing tribal courts to have the 
same ability as state courts to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage 
from an outside jurisdiction. 145 DOMA allows, however, that if a tribe 
authorizes or recognizes same-sex marriage, states and other tribes have 
no obligation to recognize that decision. 146 Under current law, tribes 
may become an island of same-sex marriage, although, given the debates 
in Cherokee and Navajo country, it might never happen. 
DOMA is a powerful statute, but it may suffer from the same con-
stitutional infirmities as many state laws banning or restricting same-sex 
marriage. Legal commentators suggest that DOMA is unconstitutional 
under several constitutional provisions. 147 Members of Congress and 
President Bush contend that the clear solution is to adopt a constitutional 
139. See id., rev'd, 455 F. 3d. 859 (D. Neb. 2006), rehearing denied en bane, 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22372 (D. Neb. 2006). 
140. See S. E. Ruckman, Third Challenge Filed to Tribal Same-Sex Marriage: A Cherokee 
Nation Court Administrator Says She Would Be Violating Tribal Law if She Filed a Lesbian 
Couple's Marriage Certificate, TULSA WORLD, March 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
3684250. 
141. See fAT Dismisses Same-Sex Marriage Injunction, CHEROKEE PHOENIX AND INDIAN 
ADVOCATE, Feb. 1,2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 6759034. 
142. See Gay Marriage Ban Polarizes Views; Council Rejects Shirley Veto of Gay Marriage 
Ban. Opposing Sides Remain Firm in Pro and Con Positions, NAVAJO TIMES, June 9, 2005, at 
AIO, available at 2005 WLNR 11935955. 
143. See Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at I U.S.c. § 7, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000». 
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). The text of this provision is as follows: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 
145. Id. 
146. See id. 
147. E.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist 
Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the 
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amendment that would ban same-sex marriage once and for all. 148 It 
does not appear at this writing that such an amendment will pass any 
time soon, but such an amendment remains a possibility. 
The various proposals focus more on the exact character of the ban 
rather than the jurisdictional questions. In national politics, where 
Indian tribes are not represented r.t all and Indian people are an under-
represented and statistically insignificant minority, forgetting the third 
sovereign is endemic. 149 Regardless, in the case of a same-sex marriage 
amendment, either including or excluding Indian tribes raises significant 
constitutional questions and implications, as the following section 
shows. 
III. IMPLICIT INCORPORATION OF INDIAN TRIBES INTO THE 
CONSTITUTION THROUGH A SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
A constitutional amendment prohibiting or authorizing same-sex 
marriage in the United States and its territories - and including Indian 
Country - could have the concomitant impact of creating implicit recog-
nition of modem Indian tribes in the Constitution and Our Federalism. 
A marriage amendment either prohibiting Indian tribes from authorizing 
or recognizing same-sex marriage or restricting Indian tribes from ban-
ning same-sex marriage, listing Indian tribes among the federal govern-
ment and the states, would be implicit recognition and slight 
modification of no fewer than four Indian law doctrines and the possible 
creation of a fifth: (1) Indian tribes are sovereigns, with inherent author-
ity over domestic relations; ISO (2) Indian tribes (somehow) are part of 
Our Federalism, even if they are not states or other entities; 151 (3) state 
Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419 
(1999). 
148. See Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra note 25, at 602-03. 
149. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 
1071 (9th Cir. 200 I) (holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act's silence as to Indian 
tribes meant that it did not apply to the tribes); State of Wash., Dept. of Ecology v. United States 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976 was silent as to Indian tribes). 
ISO. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916); COHEN, supra note 10, 
§ 4.01 [2][c] , at 215. 
151. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 
TULSA L.J. I, I (1997) ("Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign entities-
the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes. Each of the three sovereigns has its own 
judicial system, and each plays an important role in the administration of justice in this country."). 
See generally Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship 
Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 
U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994); Skibine, Imperfect Notion, supra note 41. 
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laws do not apply in Indian Country, in general;152 (4) Indian tribes are 
not subject to the Constitution's limits or mandates; 153 and (5) the 
remainder of the Constitution's limitations on federal and state govern-
mental power do not, by negative inference, apply to Indian tribes. 
First, a marriage amendment including Indian tribes would be rec-
ognition that they are the third sovereign. The Indian Commerce Clause 
lists Indian tribes along with states and foreign nations. 154 The Supreme 
Court, however, has never recognized Indian tribes to be equivalent to 
foreign nations, let alone states (although the Court once came closeI 55). 
Nevertheless, the Founders wrote that clause with the understanding that 
Indian tribes would remain outside the borders of the United States, with 
no serious discussion or expectation that the tribes would survive being 
surrounded by the states. 156 A constitutional amendment restating, in a 
way, the constitutional place of Indian tribes in the 21st century would 
be modern constitutional recognition of the place that Indian tribes hold 
in practice. And in the domestic and family law context, Indian tribes' 
authority would not be subject to questioning. 
Second, a marriage amendment mentioning Indian tribes would 
constitute an implicit incorporation of Indian tribes into Our Federalism. 
Indian tribes now have a place in Our Federalism, but that place exists at 
the sufferance of Congress, and, to a greater extent, the Supreme 
Court. 157 For example, Congress, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act,158 placed Indian tribes in the governmental scheme along with the 
states and the federal government. 159 But Congress's policy toward 
Indian tribes can change, as it often has, to a policy of assimilation of 
Indian people or even termination of Indian tribal government struc-
tures. 160 In addition, the Court, with its apparent eye toward judicial 
supremacy, may one day terminate tribal sovereignty in its entirety. 
152. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); Bryan v. 
Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-22 (1959); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 517 (1832); COHEN, supra note 10, §§ 6.01[1]-[2], at 499-506. 
153. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church ofN. Am. v. Navajo 
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (lOth Cir. 1959). 
154. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
155. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 16-17 (1831) (recognizing Indians as 
"domestic dependent nations" but not as foreign nations). 
156. See WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note II, at 103. 
157. See United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004, 1007-09 (8th Cir. 2002) (Hansen, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Congress may delegate new powers to tribes as a matter of federal common law but 
it may do so only under constitutional constraints), rev'd, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 541 
U.S. 193 (2004). 
158. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988). 
159. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2001) (creating a complex schema where Indian tribes, states, and 
federal government authorize certain forms of Indian gaming through a compacting process). 
160. See generally COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84. 
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Both of these results appear to be unrealistic, for both practical and 
political reasons,161 but they are not impossible. A marriage amendment 
including Indian tribes brings tribes into the formal constitutional struc-
ture. It would be untheorized and haphazard, but it would be 
undeniable. 
Third, inclusion of Indian tribes in a marriage amendment would 
represent an understanding that state law has no force in Indian Country. 
Inclusion of Indian tribes in the amendment would be necessary only 
because state laws cannot reach Indian Country. This principle, which 
Justice Marshall referred to as a "platonic notion," derives from the very 
early case of Worcester v. Georgia. 162 Worcester was less an Indian 
law case than a states' rights case l63 and Chief Justice Marshall carved 
out an exception to state authority to legislate over Indian tribes and 
Indian people in Indian Country.164 The Rehnquist Court backtracked 
and turned the Worcester presumption upside down when it asserted in 
dicta that state laws do apply as a presumptive matter in Indian Coun-
try.165 But the reality of Indian Country is that state and local govern-
ments, in general, do not want jurisdiction over Indian Country because 
they wish to avoid the issue. 166 Moreover, in many areas, non-Indian 
governments and non-Indian people rely on tribes for jobs, police pro-
tection, environmental protection, and other governmental and economic 
services. 167 Thus, the Worcester rule, disfavored by the current Court, 
retains de facto legitimacy in Indian Country. A marriage amendment 
161. See Joseph William Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. I, 2 (2005), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forumlissuesI119/ 
dec05/singer.pdf: 
The Court cannot seem to live with Indian nations; those nations do not fit easily 
into the constitutional structure and their place in the federal system seems obscure 
and anomalous. Yet the Supreme Court cannot live without them either; much as 
the Court would like to limit tribal sovereignty, it is neither equipped nor inclined to 
erase tribal sovereignty entirely. Indian nations are not only mentioned in the 
Constitution, but are also the subject of an entire Title of the United States Code. 
162. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251, 257 
(1992); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 515 (1832). 
163. See Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 9 
(2005). 
164. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557, 561. 
165. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001). 
166. E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native 
Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 159 (1999) (describing how state and local law enforcement 
rely on tribal courts). See Fletcher, Reviving, supra note 43, at 41-42. 
167. E.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, Betting on Their Future, A.B.A. J., May 2006, at 32, 36 
("For the state, it's a sweet deal. It doesn't have to make any concessions or put up any money to 
get a large new tax base. At Quil Ceda, for example, all the utility work for roads, sewers, water 
lines, electricity, etc., was paid for by the tribes. The Tulalips even contributed money for work 
on a new interchange from the interstate, which also benefits nearby communities. The tribes also 
hire, train and pay for their own police force."). 
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would cement that understanding and create a larger barrier to the 
Court's tendency to puncture the "platonic notion."168 
Fourth, a marriage amendment limiting tribal government activities 
to recognize or prohibit same-sex marriage establishes the federal and 
state government understanding that the Constitution includes some pro-
visions that apply to Indian tribes. Part of the incorporation of Indian 
tribes into the Constitution and the federal system is the side-effect (for 
tribes) of being subject to some mandates of that document. Indian 
tribes did not participate as sovereigns at the table during the Founding 
or any of the Constitution's amendments. They would probably also be 
excluded (without bad faith) from the negotiations and later ratification 
of a marriage amendment. 
A marriage amendment attempting to alter the inherent authority of 
Indian tribes to recognize or restrict same-sex marriage would cut into 
the undisturbed authority of Indians to make their own laws and be gov-
erned by them. It is conceivable and realistic to assume that tribes may 
resist application of this amendment to them. Moreover, some Indian 
tribes may take the view that the United States cannot incorporate tribes 
into the Constitution without consent from each of the over 560 tribes. 169 
This Article will not seek to answer these questions as they are outside 
the scope of discussion. The Article does assume, however, that the 
amendment would be successful in binding Indian tribes to its mandate. 
Indian tribes have acquiesced to federal authority for so long that to 
reject an amendment at this point could be fruitless yo 
Fifth, inclusion of Indian tribes in a marriage amendment - and in 
no other place in the Constitution except the Commerce Clause - would 
mean by negative implication that the remaining provisions of the docu-
ment do not apply to Indian tribes. For instance, the Bill of Rights does 
not limit tribal governmental authority and a marriage amendment 
would not alter that result. 171 The rest of the Constitution excludes 
Indian tribes, for example, from sending representatives to Congress and 
168. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Laurence, 
Symmetry, supra note 89, at 890. 
169. Thanks to Kirsten Carlson for reminding the author of this possibility. 
170. See generally Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its 
Development and How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 148 (1997) (arguing that Indian tribes signing treaties ceding land in 
exchange for federal protection acquiesced to federal authority). Cf generally Deloria & Newton, 
supra note 89, at 74 ("To round out what looks like a parade of horribles, the Court could also 
choose a case challenging the amendments as an opportunity to limit congressional power to 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. If Congress were to acquiesce to a limitation of its 
power to enrolled Indians, its acquiescence would unweave the complex fabric of federal 
jurisdiction and control in Indian country."). 
171. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.s. 376, 382-84 (1896); Native American Church of N. Am. v. 
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th eir. 1959). 
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the Electoral College. l72 If an amendment were passed, tribes would 
remain outside the structure of the federal-state relationship, but would 
be part of the overall structure. Even under the overall structure, how-
ever, tribes would have very limited duties and responsibilities com-
pared to states and the federal government. Incorporation of Indian 
tribes into the Constitution through a marriage amendment would serve 
to bind Indian tribes (if at all) to that provision and that provision only. 
These modifications would go a long way toward answering ques-
tions posed by some Justices. Two fundamental questions remain open 
in the Roberts Court. First, Justice Thomas appears to be a leader in 
questioning whether tribes should retain sovereignty at all, in large part 
because tribes are neither full sovereigns nor have a place in the United 
States Constitution. He has made two statements in relation to this ques-
tion: "The tribes, [in] contrast [to States and the federal government], are 
not part of this constitutional order, and their sovereignty is not guaran-
teed by it[;]"173 and "[i]t is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not 
to exist merely at the whim of an external government."174 Second, a 
corollary and resulting question is whether Indian tribes can exercise -
or whether Congress can authorize Indian tribes to exercise - jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers outside of the bounds of the individual rights 
protections contained in the Constitution. Justice Kennedy appears to be 
a leader in raising this question. He wrote, "[t]o hold that Congress can 
subject [a nonmember American citizen], within our domestic borders, 
to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a seri-
ous step."175 
A marriage amendment incorporating Indian tribes into its provi-
sions raises significant questions and, in all likelihood, may signify rec-
ognition of the American people that Indian tribes are a part of Our 
Federalism. At the founding of the Republic, Indian tribes were the 
unknown, outsider presence beyond the borders of the fledgling United 
States. As Manifest Destiny made its way west and swallowed all of the 
remains of Indian Country,176 federal policy changed toward assimila-
172. See Clinton, There Is No, supra note 29, at 258. 
173. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
174. Id. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
175. Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES 
OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 114-19 (2002) 
(restating Justice Kennedy's approach; discussing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)); Frickey, 
(Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 465-66 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's 
approach). 
176. See generally Miller, Doctrine, supra note 61, at 117-18 (explaining how the Doctrine of 
Discovery was applied by European-Americans to legally infringe on the real property and 
sovereign rights of American Indians). 
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tion and, in some cases, extermination. 177 Indian tribes survived, and in 
1934, Congress repudiated the efforts to stamp out Indian sovereignty by 
enacting the Indian Reorganization Act. 178 Still, as Justice Thomas 
stated, tribal sovereignty could be argued to exist at the sufferance of 
Congress (although one thing American history shows is that Indian 
tribes do not disappear even when "terminated"179). A marriage amend-
ment including Indian tribes would recognize in the Constitution what 
the federal government has recognized since 1934 - that Indian tribes 
are sovereign entities and are part of Our Federalism. Of course, the 
amendment alone would not define the rights and responsibilities of 
Indian tribes, states, and the federal government in relation to each. If 
the amendment does nothing more than constitutionally codify the cur-
rent state of affairs, such a result would still be a benefit to Indian tribes. 
While the extent of tribal authority will remain a question for the Court 
to ponder over and over again, no longer could anyone argue with 
authority that Indian tribes existed at the sufferance of another 
sovereign. 180 
The formal (if implicit) incorporation of Indian tribes into the Con-
stitution may answer Justice Kennedy's concern as well. Indian tribes 
would be part of the Constitution, albeit in an undefined manner. Justice 
Kennedy's theory that no non-member consented to the jurisdiction of 
Indian tribes, even in the Lockean sense of the consent of the gov-
erned, 181 would no longer have persuasive value the moment that the 
American people ratify a constitutional amendment that presumes the 
presence of Indian tribes in the constitutional system of Our Federalism. 
There would be no Tenth Amendment-type provision precluding the 
Supreme Court or Congress from limiting the authority of Indian tribes, 
but neither would there be the blank check of judicial supremacy in 
Indian law. 
177. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 75-84. 
178. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.c. §§46l-79 
(1934». 
179. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 71-75, 82, 182-89 (2005) (describing recovery of Menominee tribe after being 
terminated by Congress). 
180. One initial question that will confound constitutional law experts after an amendment 
including Indian tribes would be how to decide which Indian tribes would be included. There are 
over 560 federally-recognized Indian tribes, but these tribes are recognized either by the Secretary 
of Interior in an administrative process or through Acts of Congress. See generally Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Commentary, Politics, History, and Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian 
Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 491-492 (book review). Could any employee of the Department of 
Interior have authority to decide monumental constitutional questions? Could Congress, for that 
matter? Can the American people incorporate Indian tribes into the Constitution without asking 
for consent? Alas, these hard questions remain outside the scope of this Article. 
181. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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In sum, amending the Constitution to prevent Indian tribes from 
recognizing or prohibiting same-sex marriage creates an unusual solu-
tion to an unusual problem. The practical existence of Indian tribes as a 
third sovereign could be linked to a constitutional provision that recog-
nizes that existence. Many of the arguments made by opponents of tri-
bal governmental authority point to the fact that the Constitution does 
nothing to either protect or authorize tribal authority. A marriage 
amendment in this vein eliminates this line of argument. But, in reality, 
it is not certain or even probable that a marriage amendment would 
include Indian tribes. The final part of this Article discusses the impact 
of a same-sex marriage amendment that is silent as to Indian tribes. 
IV. IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TRIBES IN THE CONSTITUTION 
THROUGH SILENCE 
A same-sex marriage amendment that does not mention Indian 
tribes poses a very serious question for tribal advocates and leaders and, 
depending on how tribes react, to the Supreme Court. Indian tribes 
would have a few options. First, tribes could conform to the amend-
ment, as many tribes would anyway. Second, tribes could rely upon the 
Worcester rule and flaunt the amendment by authorizing same-sex mar-
riage. It is the second possibility that creates the interesting and even 
dangerous question for tribes. Part IV.A. and Part IV.B. analyze two 
theories under which the amendment could be construed to apply to 
Indian tribes - either under federal authority or state authority. Part 
IV.C. investigates the ramifications of this dispute on Our Federalism 
and proposes one possible outcome that would represent the implicit 
incorporation of Indian tribes as a constitutional entity. 
A. Federal Authority over Indian Tribes 
As a general matter, the individual rights provisions in the Consti-
tution do not apply to Indian tribes, but there may be one exception and, 
in the coming years of the Roberts Court, there may be others. Talton v. 
Mayes and its progeny made clear that the Constitution's limitations on 
governments to affect the rights of citizens do not apply to Indian 
tribes. 182 As established earlier, tribes predate the Constitution and did 
not consent to its strictures. 183 The lone exception, if it could be called 
that, is the question of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which set the vot-
ing age at 18. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus;84 the question 
182. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896); Native American Church ofN. Am. v. 
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1959). 
183. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
184. 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). 
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presented was whether the Twenty-Sixth Amendment applied to a tribal 
election on an amendment to the tribal constitution conducted by the 
Secretary of Interior. 185 Many tribal constitutions adopted after the 
Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 were "boilerplate" constitutions con-
taining similar provisions and structures. 186 One feature of these "model 
IRA constitutions" was the secretarial election, whereby the Secretary of 
Interior held and supervised elections on amendments to the tribal con-
stitution. ls7 The Secretary promulgated departmental regulations for the 
specific purpose of implementing these tribal constitutions. ISS As a 
result, the Eighth Circuit found in the case of the Cheyenne River Sioux 
elections that the election was tinged with enough federal authority so as 
to become a quasi-federal election subject to the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment. IS9 It is not clear at all why an election to amend a tribal constitu-
tion, regardless of which handholding agency conducts the mechanics of 
the election, should be subject to a federal constitutional restriction. No 
federal interest, other than a vague, amorphous interest in what tribes do, 
is implicated. One suspects that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe deci-
sion would not withstand serious scrutiny, especially after Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez. 19o In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that 
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought 
under the Indian Civil Rights ACt. 191 Thus, the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment - only in the very narrow circumstances where the Secretary is 
conducting the election - applies to Indian tribes. The remainder of the 
Constitution, dealing with the protection of individual rights, is not 
applicable. 
Would an amendment of general applicability apply to Indian 
tribes? The Supreme Court has not taken up this specific question but 
lower federal courts are now split on the issue of whether federal statutes 
of general applicability apply to Indian tribes. 192 Under the Cohen for-
mulation of tribal sovereignty,193 approved by the Court as late as 
1978,194 federal statutes do not apply to Indian tribes unless they 
185. See Andrus, 566 F.2d at 1087-88. 
186. Timothy W. loranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay: 
Secretarial Authority to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 92 
(1993-1994). 
187. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 566 F.2d at 1087-88. 
188. See 25 c.F.R. Part 81. 
189. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 566 F.2d at 1089. 
190. 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978). 
191. Id. at 58-59 (citing 25 U.S.c. § 1303). 
192. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
691, 691, 695-96 (2004) [hereinafter Singel, Labor Relations]. 
193. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 122. 
194. See Santa Clara Pueblo Y. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting COHEN, supra note 
10, at 122); United States Y. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting COHEN, supra note 10, at 
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expressly include Indian tribes in their provisions. The lower federal 
courts have handled a few dozen of these questions and, in many of the 
cases, found that a statute of general applicability will apply to Indian 
tribes. 195 The courts have adopted several amorphous tests to reach this 
conclusiop, but one area where they agree is that a statute of general 
applicability will not apply to Indian tribes where the statute affects a 
tribe's internal, domestic affairs. l96 This is a test created by the federal 
courts as a matter of federal common law. However, the result is that 
the hard inner core of tribal sovereignty remains the Williams v. Lee 
formulation that Indians have the right to make their own laws and be 
governed by them. 197 At the center of this core are domestic relations 
and family law. 198 
Here is where the marriage amendment and federal Indian law 
could meet head on. After a marriage amendment purporting to ban all 
same-sex marriages in the United States, imagine an Indian tribe, for 
example, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, 
amending its marriage code to allow for marriages between same-sex 
couples. 199 Perhaps the Band's tribal court then presides over the mar-
riages of several same-sex couples - tribal members, nonmember Indi-
ans, non-Indians, and maybe even foreign nationals20o - and attracts the 
attention of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Mich-
igan. The U.S. Attorney may then choose to bring an action seeking an 
injunction against the Band and its court from authorizing any other 
same-sex marriages and request a declaratory judgment that the mar-
riage amendment applies to the Band. 
Foundational principles of federal Indian law201 suggest that the 
marriage amendment could not restrict the tribe's government authority 
in this area. The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Twenty-Sixth 
122); Robert A. Williams, The Hermeneutics of Indian Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1012, 1020 (1987) 
(reviewing WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note II). 
195. See Singel, Labor Relations, supra note 192, at 691 n.3 (citing cases by the lower courts 
of appeal). 
196. See id. at 706-07 (citing Donovan v. Coeur d' Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 
(9th Cir. 1985)). 
197. See 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959). 
198. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 602, 606 (1916); see also Santa Clara Pueblo, 
436 U.S. at 55-56 (citing Quiver, 241 U.S. at 602; Williams, 358 U.S. at 217). 
199. The Grand Traverse Band Code now defines marriage as "the legal union of one (I) man 
and one (I) woman as husband and wife for life or until divorced." 10 Grand Traverse Band Code 
§ 50 I (e), available at http://www.narf.org/niIUCodes/gtcode/travcodeIOchildfameld.htm. 
200. Cf Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, Nos. 03-143, 1529-1530-1531, 1819, 
2005.NACE.0000OO7 (Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Supreme Court 2005) (asserting 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian alien). 
201. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 32, at 437-43; Frickey, 
Congressional Intent, supra note 41, at 1210; Getches, Beyond, supra note 58, at 360; Getches, 
Conquering, supra note 32, at 1654; Singel, Labor Relations, supra note 192, at 697-02. 
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Amendment applies to Secretarial elections relied on the federal interest 
in the election,z°2 The Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court, like most 
tribal courts, relies on federal funds to some extent, but the reliance is 
not mandated by federal law, unlike the elections in Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe. A federal court judgment that the marriage amendment 
does not apply to Indian Country would retain the unusual consistency 
of federal Indian law: the constitutional individual rights protections do 
not apply to Indian tribes, but Congress has authority to legislate on 
Indian affairs and bind the tribes. 
But same-sex marriage may have more salience than other constitu-
tional provisions. Perhaps like abortion, the fact that a tribal jurisdiction 
continues to authorize or prohibit same-sex marriage would generate 
enormous controversy from outsiders and political pressure to force 
these nonconforming tribes to stop. Perhaps there are some constitu-
tional individual rights protections that are so fundamental to American 
society that that the federal courts would somehow see fit to extend 
these restrictions on Indian tribes,203 despite clear federal law to the con-
trary. The Eighth Circuit's decision on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
avoided the main problem by coating the governmental action com-
plained of with a federal cloak of authority, but with same-sex marriage 
the same federal action would not occur. A decision extending the reach 
of the marriage amendment to Indian Country would be unprecedented, 
but not outside the realm of possibility.204 
B. State Authority over Indian Tribes 
Whether state laws banning or authorizing same-sex marriage could 
be extended into Indian Country after a same-sex marriage amendment 
excluding mention of Indian tribes is a closer question than whether the 
amendment itself would apply to Indian tribes. Some state laws do 
reach into Indian Country, with the Supreme Court's support,205 but 
state laws have never been held to reach further than federal laws into 
the hard inner core of tribal authority over domestic relations. 
202. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). 
203. Cf RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 132 (2006) ("[IJn some circumstances, fidelity 
[to the Constitution] might be trumped by justice."). 
204. Although the discussion is outside the scope of this Article, whether a same-sex marriage 
amendment would apply at all to Indian Country may depend on the cultural context of same-sex 
relationships. See Wenona T. Singel, What's Unique About the Same-Sex Marriage Debate in 
Indian Country, Address at Helen Hamilton Day, University of North Dakota School of Law 
(March 31, 2006). 
205. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676, 688-89 (2005); Dept. of 
Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1994); Rice v. Rehner, 
463 U.S. 713, 718, 725-26 (1983). 
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The possibility of using state authority to enforce a same-sex mar-
riage amendment against Indian tribes would seem fruitless where fed-
eral constitutional authority is lacking. However, the Supreme Court's 
federal Indian law pronouncements suggest that state laws could pene-
trate tribal authority where significant (if not extreme) impacts of tribal 
exercises of governmental authority extend beyond the Indian Country 
borders. The Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,206 in 
upholding tribal authority to regulate Indian Country hunting and fishing 
to the exclusion of New Mexico, relied on a rule providing for the opera-
tion of state laws in Indian Country where "the state interests at stake are 
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.''207 These circum-
stances must be ''exceptional.''208 And, according to Judge Canby, "[i]t 
should be emphasized . . . that the occasions when states have been 
permitted to regulate Indians in Indian country have been rare and truly 
exceptional."209 States have been permitted to regulate (or co-regulate) 
tribal fishing rights,210 collect state taxes from tribal retailers,211 and reg-
ulate on-reservation liquor sales.212 But in areas such as high-stakes 
bingo and casino operations, states have little or no say under federal 
Indian law.213 
States have no authority to regulate on-reservation domestic rela-
tions, particularly, as the Laughing Whitefish case demonstrates.214 
Additionally, in United States v. Quiver,215 a case holding that the fed-
eral government may not prosecute reservation Indians for adultery, Jus-
tice Van Devanter foreclosed the possibility of state jurisdiction over on-
reservation domestic relations.216 Thus, it would be hard under normal 
circumstances to find a state interest that would justify meeting the very 
high standard set by the Court in the case of the Mescalero Apache 
Tribe. If on-reservation high-stakes bingo does not meet the standard, 
why would same-sex marriage? Same-sex marriage may not meet the 
standard, but there is no constitutional provision dealing with bingo, and 
thus that scenario is different than the circumstances proposed here. 
Moreover, a federal court's conception of "justice" might undo this doc-
206. 462 U.S. 324, 324 (1983). 
207. ld. at 334 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)). 
208. ld. at 331-32 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977)). 
209. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 289 (4th ed. 2004). 
210. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. at 173-75. 
211. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
159, 161-62 (1980). 
212. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720-22 (1983). 
213. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1987). 
214. See Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605-06 (Mich. 1889). 
215. 241 U.S. 602,602 (1916). 
216. See id. at 603, 606. 
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trine of law.217 In short, the result is not foreordained or obvious. 
C. The Potential Impact on Our Federalism and Federal Indian Law 
A marriage amendment excluding mention of Indian tribes raises 
recognition of Indian tribes as a constitutional player, if not full partici-
pant, in Our Federalism. As the law stands now, Indian tribes are 
neither constitutional players nor constitutional outlaws. Indian tribes 
do not enjoy the full pantheon of individual rights provided by the Con-
stitution, such as the right to state-paid indigent defense.218 But neither 
do tribes have felony jurisdiction.219 Some tribes are operating govern-
ments that could be classified as theocracies,220 but others have a form 
of Athenian direct democracy (including women and non-propertied 
interests)22I that goes beyond American representative democracy.222 
Tribes act outside the Constitution as "preconstitutional" or "extraconsti-
tutional" sovereigns. 
But tribes as yet have neither done anything that sufficiently shocks 
the constitutional conscience for a court to find that some or all of the 
individual rights protections of the Constitution must apply to the 
"preconstitutional" tribal sovereigns nor have they done anything suffi-
cient to induce the American people to amend the Constitution. Tribes 
practiced polygamy223 and interracial marriage224 - no response. Tribes 
exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians225 - no response (at 
217. See DWORKIN, supra note 203, at 132. 
218. See 25 U.S.c. § 1302(6) (2001) (granting right to counsel, but not right to govemment-
paid counsel). 
219. See 25 U.S.c. § 1302(7) (2001) (limiting tribal criminal penalties to one year). 
220. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 118, at 361-62. 
221. See Candido v. Viejas Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, No. 
D043342, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6582, at *4 (Cal. App., July 13, 2004); Sandra Hansen, 
Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990,16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 319, 319-20 (1991). 
222. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 
195-96 (1996); Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 709, 729 n.69 (1994) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, 
ed. 1961)). See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411, 457 (2004) (discussing "historical and theological precedents that 
contributed to the Framers' rejection of direct democracy at the constitutional Conventions). 
223. See Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.w. 602,605 (Mich. 1889). 
224. See Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r, 30 Mo. 72, 84, 86 (Mo. 1860); Morgan v. M'Ghee, 24 
Tenn. 13, 14 (Tenn. 1844). 
225. See George E. Foster, A Legal Episode in the Cherokee Nation, 4 GREEN BAG 484, 489-
90 (1892) (describing criminal trial of a non-Indian). See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE 
AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 168-74 (1975) (describing Cherokee 
criminal law). 
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least in the 19th century).226 Tribes opened gaming operations227 - no 
response.228 The Supreme Court has often held that Indian tribes do not 
have certain vestiges of their inherent sovereign authority,229 but it has 
never held that the Constitution's individual rights protections apply to 
limit or restrict the government operations of Indian tribes. 
Would tribal nonconformance with the same-sex marriage amend-
ment shock the constitutional conscience? Let us assume it does and let 
us assume that the Supreme Court's response230 is similar to other times 
when it disapproves of the actions of tribal governments - in other 
words, implicit divestiture. A holding that Indian tribes do not, by virtue 
of their dependent status, have inherent authority to recognize (or pro-
hibit) same-sex marriages would be expected and consistent with previ-
ous decisions. But unlike other times when the Court has found an 
implicit divestiture, this case would be the first in which the implicit 
divestiture was intended to force Indian tribes to act in conformance 
with a specific individual rights provision of the Constitution. Other 
implicit divestitures (criminal and civil jurisdiction,231 foreign nation 
status,232 property rights233) were not intended to force tribes to conform 
to specific rights provisions in the Constitution. 
Extending the logic of the result to other cases (mimicking Justice 
Scalia234) may result in the Court's invalidation of all tribal prosecutions 
226. However, the Supreme Court divested Indian tribes of this authority in 1978, without 
reference to a constitutional provision mandating such a result. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195, 197,202 (1978). 
227. See KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND POLICY 
20-24 (2006). 
228. In fact, the Court held that state laws could not apply to Indian gaming. See California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
229. E.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (civil jurisdiction on non-Indian 
lands); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195, 197,202 (1978) (criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 16, 17 (1831) (foreign nation status); 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589-90 (1823) (full assortment of land ownership rights). 
230. It seems more probable that the Court would be quicker to act than Congress. Congress 
could once again amend the Indian Civil Rights Act to include a provision on same-sex marriage, 
but it would serve only to beg the question. 
231. E.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 453; Duro, 495 U.S. at 688. 
232. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16, 17. 
233. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589-90. 
234. E.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding 
is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of 
directions to go. What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits on the 
ground that taxpayers' freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense? 
This may seem fanciful, but recall that France has proposed banning religious attire from schools, 
invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today."). See MARK 
TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
150 (2005). 
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for failure to conform to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to indi-
gent counsel.235 Perhaps the Court will then invalidate exercises of tri-
bal government authority establishing a religion. Though it is far from 
certain, the Court could decide that tribal governments do not have to 
conform to the Constitution. The Court could also divest tribes of all 
authority to take actions contrary to the Constitution. By implication, 
the Court could conclude that the Constitution does apply to Indian 
tribes. Would this result differ from the conclusion that the First 
Amendment applies to states?236 
If the Court concludes through a series of implicit divestiture deci-
sions - starting with a tribal same-sex marriage case - that the Constitu-
tion does apply to Indian tribes, then perhaps Indian tribes will become 
part of Our Federalism. The logic follows: (1) Indian tribes are here to 
stay as sovereigns; (2) the Court recognizes tribes as sovereigns; and (3) 
the Court will apply (through the implicit divestiture doctrine) the Con-
stitution's individual rights provisions to the tribes. The only step miss-
ing (and it is the most important) is the language in the Constitution 
incorporating Indian tribes. But similar language is missing from the 
Fourteenth Amendment.237 Perhaps the logical conclusion of the 
implicit divestiture doctrine, as the Court might have begun to explain it 
(in terms of individual rights), is incorporation of Indian tribes into the 
Federal Union. In other words, since the Constitution is a compact 
among sovereigns, holding Indian tribes to the letter of the Constitution 
amounts to recognition by the Court that tribes are part of the compact 
between the federal government and the states. 
CONCLUSION 
Long ago, the Michigan Supreme Court identified a conundrum in 
federal Indian law. "We must either hold that there can be no valid 
Indian marriage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid by which 
Indian usages are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be 
235. But see Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court's 
Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 
BYU J. PUB. L. 173, 183-84 (2000); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 403, 430-32 (2004). 
236. See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory 
of the First Amendment, 75 TuL. L. REv. 251, 327-28 (2000). Cf generally Jerold H. Israel, 
Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982) (providing an early introduction 
of the selective incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Ohio ex reI. Eaton v. 
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960))); Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment 
Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process 
Clauses, 71 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.comJabstract=723501 (last 
visited April 24, 2006). 
237. See CURRIE, supra note 70, at 252. 
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taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes."238 That 
conundrum remains, even after more than a hundred years of shifting 
and inconsistent federal Indian policy and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
And the conundrum could be highlighted by a constitutional 
amendment on same-sex marriage. In the arena of domestic relations, 
either American law trumps tribal law or it does not. If American law 
does not trump tribal law, even after an amendment, then Indian tribes 
remain constitutional outlaws, retaining inherent sovereignty and exer-
cising the sovereign powers of a third sovereign alive and well within 
Our Federalism. If American law trumps tribal law after an amendment, 
then Indian tribes become part of Our Federalism by virtue of incorpora-
tion into the Constitution. 
Indian tribes are part of Our Federalism one way or the other. A 
same-sex marriage amendment might bring incorporation of Indian 
tribes into the Constitution to the forefront because domestic relations, 
the particular subject matter of the amendment, would create an unex-
pected constitutional crisis. For Indian tribes seeking entry into the con-
stitutional structure (and not all tribes do), the crisis would be more of an 
opportunity. But for the Court, struggling to balance its federalism juris-
prudence between just two sovereigns,239 the addition of Indian tribes as 
a third constitutional sovereign may force it to push the reset button on 
federal Indian law. 
238. Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605 (Mich. I 889). 
239. Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding that federal 
criminalization of medicinal marijuana did not violate Commerce Clause), with Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 916-17 (2006) (finding that U.S. Attorney General did not have authority 
to prevent state from authorizing physician-assisted suicide). 
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